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Abstract
As AI systems become prevalent in high stakes domains such
as surveillance and healthcare, researchers now examine how
to design and implement them in a safe manner. However, the
potential harms caused by systems to stakeholders in complex
social contexts and how to address these remains unclear. In
this paper, we explain the inherent normative uncertainty in
debates about the safety of AI systems. We then address this
as a problem of vagueness by examining its place in the de-
sign, training, and deployment stages of AI system develop-
ment. We adopt Ruth Chang’s theory of intuitive compara-
bility to illustrate the dilemmas that manifest at each stage.
We then discuss how stakeholders can navigate these dilem-
mas by incorporating distinct forms of dissent into the de-
velopment pipeline, drawing on Elizabeth Anderson’s work
on the epistemic powers of democratic institutions. We out-
line a framework of sociotechnical commitments to formal,
substantive and discursive challenges that address normative
uncertainty across stakeholders, and propose the cultivation
of related virtues by those responsible for development.
Introduction
As the capabilities of AI expand, researchers must consider
the problem of AI Safety, defined broadly as the design of
machines that can act independently while avoiding harm
to people and the environment. This problem has become
more urgent as these systems are technically refined, applied
in critical infrastructure domains, and deployed in areas of
social life not clearly related to physical harm (e.g. social
media, credit scoring, public surveillance). Meanwhile, the
core definitions of “safety” (and consequently appropriate
control and governance mechanisms) in the wider literature
of autonomous systems remain unsettled.
Distinct approaches to AI Safety have emerged to define
the uncertain scale at which AI systems may cause signifi-
cant social harm. At one end of this continuum is Existential
Risk (hereafter referred to as x-risk), i.e. the effort to mathe-
matically formalize control strategies that help avoid the cre-
ation of systems whose deployment would result in irrepara-
ble harm to humans on a societal or civilization level. The
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x-risk literature has focused on the value alignment prob-
lem; to ensure values programmed into an AI agent’s re-
ward function correspond with the values of relevant stake-
holders (such as designers, users or others affected by the
agent’s actions) (Soares 2015). Another approach, broadly
pursued by researchers and increasingly social scientists in
the Fairness, Accountability and Transparency in Comput-
ing Systems (FAT*) literature, focuses on nearer-term prob-
lems broadly commensurate with existing social ills such as
economic inequality, structural racism and gender dispari-
ties, and the capability of systems to (mis)recognize human
affect or deny access to vital resources, among many other
topics. FAT* research has harvested a multitude of defini-
tions and tools aiming to address safety risks by diagnosing
and reducing biases across various subgroups defined along
lines of race, gender or social class (Narayanan 2018).
In both the FAT* and x-risk communities, a consen-
sus is emerging on the fundamental limitations of tech-
nical approaches to formalize values such as safety or
fairness in the design of AI systems, given the uncer-
tainty of deployment contexts and the inevitability of
externalities in using formal abstractions. Within x-risk,
(Hadfield-Menell and Hadfield 2018) have acknowledged
the need for external social institutions to resolve “uninten-
tional and unavoidable misspecification” in AI reward func-
tions, and (Irving and Askell 2019) propose to recruit so-
cial scientists to help resolve “many uncertainties related
to the psychology of human rationality, emotion, and bi-
ases”. Within FAT*, (Selbst et al. 2019) pointed out the fun-
damental traps of abstraction that arise in formalizing no-
tions of fairness in AI systems statistically and mathemat-
ically, while (Chouldechova 2017) demonstrated tradeoffs
arising in formalizing fairness that require moral deliber-
ation. However, the criteria for evaluating and resolving
harms remain vague across technical research communities,
even as the call for an ”algorithmic social contract” has crys-
tallized (Rahwan 2018).
Here we address the unavoidable challenge of normative
uncertainty in the development of AI systems, and articu-
late a set of commitments to address and resolve norma-
tive issues as they arise in any given development process.
We work from the assumption that AI systems are funda-
mentally of sociotechnical nature, meaning they are built on
and operated in contexts in which social and technical as-
pects are intimately interrelated. This paper makes four con-
tributions. Firstly, we discuss normative uncertainty around
the notion of safety by analyzing a case study, as condi-
tioned by how different stakeholders interpret issues of pro-
tection, robustness, and resiliency. Secondly, we outline ex-
isting responses to normative uncertainty in developing AI
systems. Thirdly, we introduce the philosophical concept of
vagueness to account for dominant intuitions about norma-
tive uncertainty in the AI Safety and FAT* literatures, as well
as discussions thereof by critics and in the public sphere,
as typifying distinct canonical approaches to dealing with
vagueness (i.e. epistemicism, semantic indeterminism, and
incomparability). Lastly, to inspire the resolution of norma-
tive uncertainty in the development of AI systems, we draw
on Ruth Chang’s notion of intuitive comparability (IC) to
identify core dilemmas in designing, training and deploy-
ing AI systems. We formulate a set of sociotechnical com-
mitments, which address formal, substantive and discursive
challenges, that are needed to consider values and stakehold-
ers’ needs in a democratic fashion. In doing so, we formalize
specific channels for dissent before, during, and after value
commitments are being considered, building on the outline
of democratic consensus-building in (Anderson 2006).
Our core contribution is to apply an insight that scholars
in Science & Technology Studies (STS) have appreciated
for over four decades: the reality that any technological sys-
tem is inherently political and requires normative delibera-
tion and ongoing citizen participation to ensure its safety for
all stakeholders affected by its actions (Winner 1980).
The Vagueness of Safety - ACLU vs. AWS
Safety has many definitions depending on context. For the
purpose of study, we start with interpreting safety in terms
of protection from harm or injury, robustness in the face of
adverse conditions, and resiliency in response to stress or
difficulty. However, the vagueness of these terms as applied
to different stakeholders makes it difficult for safety to be
deliberated in a meaningful and consistent way.
One example is the AmazonWeb Services (AWS) Rekog-
nition system. AWS intended Rekognition to be a commer-
cially available cloud based ML tool that helps enterprises
with setting up and searching image based datasets for var-
ious facial recognition tasks (Amazon Web Services 2019).
By design, the system is flexible and allows users to define
their own data sets and queries, since it is meant to perform
well for tasks as simple as document retrieval and as com-
plex as image-based sentiment analysis. To test the system’s
limitations, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
created a data set made up of publicly available arrest pho-
tos and used these to train Rekognition. They then queried
the system to find a match against photos of current mem-
bers of Congress (Snow 2018). The ACLU reported not only
that false identifications were found, but that of those mem-
bers of Congress falsely identified as matching the arrest
photo database, a disproportionate number (40%) were peo-
ple of color. The ACLU concluded that Rekognition shows
a bias in its predictions, making it unsafe to implement in
high stakes contexts which disproportionately affect peo-
ple of color (e.g. law enforcement). However, the AWS re-
search team issued a rebuttal, commenting that Rekogni-
tion was used against its articulated design specifications
(Wood 2018). In particular, they noted that the ACLU used
a lower-than-recommended confidence threshold for a high
risk task, leading to a large number of false positives. More-
over, since the ACLU did not detail how they constructed
their data set, it is unclear how much inherent bias existed
in the queried set. Below we detail the forms of vagueness
present in this scenario and identify relevant trade-offs.
First, it is unclear what protection means in development
situations where private and public definitions are both at
stake. Concretely, many AI systems are validated internally
by private corporations, only to be misused in deployment
due to poor communication about the inner workings of the
system to the wider public. In part, the conflict between
Amazon and the ACLU is based on a category mistake in
how the boundaries of different political guarantees are re-
fashioned by the development norms of the system in ques-
tion. For example, the ACLU’s claim that facial recogni-
tion systems beneath a given accuracy threshold should not
be used by law enforcement is rooted in the intuition that
correcting misclassifications a posteriori is politically un-
acceptable, as it imposes Amazon’s internal definitions of
harm and vulnerability onto anyone that encounters the sys-
tem. In contrast, Amazon’s claim that the system does work
according to design intentions and that the ACLU study used
inappropriate settings makes sense in the context of system
optimization, as the AWS team converged on the system’s
architectural parameters through agreements with the pri-
vate contractors who intend to use it. Fundamentally, it is
not clear whether the safety of Rekognition should be de-
termined by its protection of private contracts (whose con-
text is the online verification of edge cases by self-interested
parties) or public assurances (whose context is the willing-
ness to shield vulnerable communities from harm). While
both Amazon and the ACLU value protection, the legal con-
texts for their practical definitions of it are orthogonal, and
the loci of perceived stakes are at two different points in the
development pipeline. To resolve this vagueness, either one
definition must be given absolute priority over the other, or
formal distinctions across the pipeline must be clarified and
subject to a consistent, external standard.
Second, conditions of robustness must be specified ac-
cording to the distinct expectations of designers and users,
leading to inconsistent standards for platform governance.
One can imagine AWS issuing a different response that in-
cluded an apology to members of Congress, a request for
the ACLU to expand its ”testing” to other social domains,
and a promise to improve Rekognition’s accuracy going
forward. However, this strategy might also become an ob-
ject of public outcry; for example, Waymo regularly pub-
lishes safety reports on its vehicles but still faces the ire of
Phoenix residents, who complain that ”They didn’t ask us if
we wanted to be part of their beta test” (Romero 2019). In-
deed, a handful of American cities have now banned the use
of facial recognition by municipal agencies, citing surveil-
lance concerns, local community interests, and social prej-
udice (Lee 2019). The question is whether cities and other
social domains should be made ready for facial recogni-
tion tools (through e.g. concrete institutional reforms), or the
tools should be made ready for cities to use them with confi-
dence (via e.g. ongoing technical refinement). How one an-
swers this question places the onus of sociotechnical robust-
ness on either the public officialswho administer the system
or the engineers who build it, a problem known as defin-
ing the ”moral crumple zone” of moral and legal responsi-
bility (Elish 2019). While all stakeholders might want the
system to be robust, it is not clear what criteria should de-
termine the conditions under which robustness would hold,
and which authorities are most qualified to ensure those con-
ditions. Because system development transposes inherited
notions of governance and control, specific liability mech-
anisms (e.g. moratoriums, audits) cannot be adopted or jus-
tified until these notions are clarified and made compatible.
Third, a system’s resiliency requires a metric of opti-
mality, according to which abnormal dynamics can be dis-
cerned, diagnosed, and remedied. At a minimum, facial
recognition assumes some definition of what a face is, and
what the good, bad, and inaccurate ways there may be for
identifying them. While the dispute between AWS and the
ACLU did not reach this level of abstraction, we must con-
front how AI systems may affect our political sovereignty
and rewire social orders by shifting how human features are
modeled, correlated, and interpreted. Recently, Luke Stark
has argued that facial recognition tools are a form of racism
that will incline any power structure towards discrimina-
tory policies because the ability to rank facial features at
scale will generate categories that can be used both to sol-
der somatic attributes to personality characteristics and to
legitimize political decisions (Stark 2019). To avoid this fu-
ture, such tools should be regulated to the point that they
are hardly ever used.Meanwhile, (Wang and Kosinski 2017)
claim to detect sexual orientation with the aid of deep neu-
ral networks and that the predictive power of AI models
can be harnessed to discover patterns in facial features be-
neath human awareness. While the findings generated con-
troversy (Murphy 2017; Vincent 2017), Kosinski defended
the study as an effort to “understand people, social pro-
cesses, and behavior better through the lens of digital foot-
prints” (Resnick 2018), questioning whether automated sys-
tems can only reify existing social ontologies or substan-
tively challenge current intuitions about gender and sex-
uality. This contrast highlights the vague relationship be-
tween feature orderings in particular contexts, and the gen-
eral goals or ends that define human flourishing. The safety
of a facial recognition system is determined by how its dy-
namics are defined in light of overarching risks and benefits:
as illegitimate (making resiliency impossible) or legitimate
(defining a sovereign metric for acceptable uses and out-
comes). The deliberation behind this amounts to what kind
of society is wanted.
Resolving Vagueness via Hard Choices
We draw from Ruth Chang’s philosophical work on value
pluralism (Chang 1997; Chang 2002) to develop a so-
ciotechnical semantics for AI Safety. At certain deployment
scales, what we mean by “privacy”, “security”, or “social
choice” starts to feel unclear, as it is difficult to determine
the stakes of our own value commitments. In philosophical
terms, the relations between our values become vague.
Chang outlines three distinct approaches to vagueness:
(1) epistemicism - all items of value can be ranked against
each other in order for vagueness to be resolved, (2) seman-
tic indeterminism - the way values relate to each other is
fundamentally fuzzy, and (3) value pluralism - values are
incomparable. In the Appendix, we further introduce these
approaches and tie them to recent work in addressing nor-
mative uncertainty in the development of AI systems.
Here we introduce an alternative perspective, which forms
the basis for our proposal of sociotechnical commitments
in the AI development process. (Chang 2017) proposes a
fourth position, intuitive comparability (IC): while many hu-
man values seem incommensurable (e.g. equality vs. lib-
erty), humans are nevertheless able to articulate evaluative
differences to make comparisons, even if two values or con-
cepts are not directly measurable against each other. This
allows people to make informed tradeoffs between options
(e.g. choosing between a banana and a donut for break-
fast) based on practical deliberation regarding one’s over-
arching goal (losing weight on a diet), even though nutri-
tion and tastiness are qualitatively distinct–the values are
objectively incommensurable but, in this context, intuitively
comparable. IC is particularly relevant for what she calls
hard choices: when different alternatives are on a par, “it
may matter very much which you choose, but one alterna-
tive isn’t better than the other [...] alternatives are in the
same neighborhood of value, in the same league of value,
while at the same time being very different in kind of value
(Chang 2017). Resolving hard choices requires normative
reasoning: “when your given reasons are on a par, you have
the normative power to create new will-based reasons for
one option over another by putting your agency behind some
feature of one of the options. By putting your will behind a
feature of an option - by standing for it - you can be that in
virtue of which something is a will-based reason for choos-
ing that option.”
The Case for Intuitive Comparability in AI Safety
We endorse IC and parity not as a superior philosophical
position in opposition to others, but as a lens from which
to ask and analytically identify what a cohesive approach to
AI Safety would look like. In the development of AI sys-
tems, IC provides a foundation for normative reasoning be-
tween possible value regimes. Hard choices cannot be de-
termined through purely quantitative thresholds; instead, IC
suggests the iterative redrawing of a system’s formal bound-
aries and design parameters via qualitative feedback. The
“hard choice” moments are those where different commu-
nities, comprising the affected stakeholders, may clash and
new development criteria (what Chang calls “will-based rea-
sons”) must be specified. This matches the intuition that
the design of AI systems restructures the context in which
users or other affected stakeholders exist: “values emerge,
whether you look for them or not” (Halloran et al. 2009).
(Iversen, Halskov, and Leong 2010) argue this requires an
“a priori commitment to cultivate the emergence and dis-
covery of local expressions of values whilst being mindful
of further expression of values during the course of the de-
sign process”. In addition, the value hierarchy designed into
a system will determine the space of actions available to it
(as well as those that the system forecloses), and it is crucial
to acknowledge and account for the power and elevated sta-
tus of design work. This means recognizing developers’ ten-
dencies to prioritize certain actors and networks over others.
(Haraway 1988), (Harding 1986) and other feminist schol-
ars would argue that we cannot escape having some agenda:
after all, the researcher is also situated in the social world
they study. A crucial corollary of the above is that develop-
ers have the responsibility to take a political stance. As Ben
Green notes, “to remain apolitical is itself a political stance
- a fundamentally conservative one (in the sense of main-
taining the status quo rather than in relation to any specific
political party or movement) - and why the field’s current at-
tempts to promote ‘social good’ dangerously rely on vague
and unarticulated political assumptions” (Green 2018).
AI Safety also presents two sources of nuance to hard
choices. Firstly, AI systems need to encode hard choices
made by or on behalf of a diverse group of stakehold-
ers affected by the system, including divergent values
and interests. These are fundamentally political, which
is well understood in the STS literature (Winner 1980).
Our goal is to build an analytical framework to draw
attention to these moments and facilitate bridges between
the ongoing contributions of AI Safety research and the
core substantive insights of STS scholarship. Secondly,
the values that stakeholders care about are often complex
and not readily translated into a solution that suits all
needs, which can lead to situations of moral overload
that require thinking outside of the traditional design
space (Van den Hoven, Lokhorst, and Van de Poel 2012).
As such, we extend and elaborate the argument of
(Hadfield-Menell and Hadfield 2018) that acknowledges the
need to address misspecification between reward functions
and wider social institutions.
Those responsible for developing and governing AI sys-
tems have the duty to mediate hard choices and the corre-
sponding value conflicts across different stakeholders, al-
lowing them to resolve these choices through both quantita-
tive and qualitative evaluation. Like the maintenance of ca-
bles that span a suspension bridge, AI Safety can be defined
as the successful maintenance of the relations that comprise
the conceptual space of comparability for human values
across all stakeholders. Just as the “stress point” of civil en-
gineering is the identified and agreed-upon maximum strain
the bridge can handle before buckling, the critical point for
human-compatible AI is the safeguarding of comparability,
i.e. the capability of AI systems to support pluralist value hi-
erarchies while preserving shared moral agency; the power
to engage in design, training, and deployment.
Sociotechnical Commitments in Developing AI
We propose a set of commitments that situate the design,
training and deployment stages of AI systems in their
sociotechnical context and center and address issues of
vagueness. The commitments are comprised of formal,
substantive and discursive challenges to the development
process in order to safeguard stakeholders’ access to hard
choices in system development. Formally, these chal-
lenges comprise distinct tradeoffs that are unavoidable in
the agonistic development of systems that must inherit,
translate, and instantiate conflicting values. Substantively,
they condition our value commitments in a manner that is
not zero-sum, extending the boundaries of the system and
design space to ensure the expression of intuitively compa-
rable human values and resolve situations of moral over-
load (Van den Hoven, Lokhorst, and Van de Poel 2012).
Discursively, they compel communication between stake-
holders: formulating the problem, evaluating systems that
would solve it, and articulating the values and needs that the
system must address in order to be safe. We posit that such
ongoing stakeholder engagement requires “reflexive inquiry
[that] places all of its concepts and methods at risk [...] not
as a threat to rationality but as a promise of a better way of
doing things” (Agre 1997).
Following (Anderson 2006), we emphasize the need for
dissent mechanisms during the design, testing, and imple-
mentation of automated systems. Tracking dissent is nec-
essary in order to respect the IC of available value hierar-
chies while reconceiving AI development as an opportunity
to reimagine the moral communities to which we belong.
This choice is in itself normative, and may inspire particular
legal translations depending on the application domain and
the jurisdiction and democratic regime in which a system is
built. In many instances, regulatory measures may form ei-
ther an existing source of constraints and requirements in the
development process, or be informed by it. The authors do
not advocate particular law or policy interpretations, but see
such translation work as a natural extension of this paper.
To illustrate our sociotechnical commitments, we will re-
fer to the AWS-ACLU case study described earlier. We con-
sider the relevant hard choices made throughout the design,
training, and deployment of the Rekognition system and il-
lustrate their political impact. At each stage, we ask: (1)
how does vagueness arise and what forms may IC take? (2)
In what concrete ways can formal affordances, substantive
commitments, and discursive practices address these issues?
Design
AI systems generally represent a predictive model that can
be trained and used in the decision making capabilities of
some human agent or automated control system. As the
model represents an abstraction of the phenomenon about
which it makes predictions, the chosen model parameteriza-
tion and the training data used to determine parameter values
delimit the possible value hierarchies that may be encoded
and, if not anticipated and accounted for, may deny stake-
holders the opportunity to evaluate design alternatives and
force potentially harmful and unsafe hard choices. To har-
ness IC in the design stage, the following challenges must
be taken up: (1) Formal challenge: Make explicit and nego-
tiate what can and cannot be modeled and inferred, crystal-
lized in the model-based/model-free dilemma; (2) Substan-
tive challenge: Make a modeling commitment whose appli-
cation constraints leave flexibility for different stakeholders
to forge their own values during training and deployment;
(3) Discursive commitment: validate the design with stake-
holders to anticipate possible value conflicts that can arise
due to the gap between model and world and plurality of
values during deployment, preparing for design iterations.
The design stage determines the computational powers of
the system: how the limits of what it can model determine
its assumptions about people and what kinds of objects or
classes (e.g. faces) are recognizable to it. At a minimum,
stakeholders must answer the following:
Model-based: What domain knowledge is available to
model the environment? I.e. what is the permissible space
in which a given problem can be formulated and solved, and
what modeling tools are available?
Model-free: What are permissible predictive signals
within the environment? I.e. what are the base rewards, el-
ements, or qualities that could shape the system’s policies?
How should these take qualitative precedence over others?
Formally, the dilemma manifests in choosing a model ca-
pacious enough to represent the nature of the environment,
but constrained enough that its training would not be in-
tractable. Imposing modeling constraints also creates tech-
nical bias, which may take away space for stakeholders to
express or protect their own specific values in terms of the
phenomena permitted or excluded by the model’s system
boundaries. In the context of our case study, the dilemma
rests in the choice between giving Rekognition some hard-
coded limitations on how the algorithm may be used, vs.
permitting the algorithm to extract whatever signals it needs
in order to maximize its predictive accuracy. While AWS
did not address this in its response to the ACLU, they could
have done so accordingly: either transition to a more auto-
mated decision procedure that sacrifices direct human over-
sight but is more accurate for the congressional dataset at
stake, or propose a governance structure to mediate the ethi-
cal and legal applicability of the tool and ratify the environ-
mental conditions a system is allowed to represent (here, the
features appropriate for recognizing representatives’ faces).
Either way, the dilemma is resolved via context discern-
ment, the disqualification of specific features and actions
within the problem space in advance of deployment. Here
we draw from (Dreyfus and Kelly 2011): “The task of the
craftsman is not to generate the meaning, but rather to culti-
vate in himself the skill for discerning the meanings that are
already there”. Design teams need to consider how the al-
gorithm is expected to be integrated in and interacting with
the context of deployment, what bias issues may arise dur-
ing training and how to account for and protect vulnerable
user groups, and how chosen objective functions may gen-
erate externalities, as well as who is likely to bear their cost.
In the event no consensus is reached and dissent persists, the
option of not designing the system should remain viable.
Training
After certain features and ways of modeling have been dis-
qualified through design commitments, the specific weights
and the structure of the predictive mapping must be deter-
mined by performing an optimization problem. This deter-
mines the input-output behavior of the model and how it will
interact with human agents and other systems. Through the
recruitment of historical and experimental data, the system
can (1) infer causal model parameters, (2) infer parameters
of noncausal representations, and (3) iteratively adjust pa-
rameters based on ongoing experiments (as in reinforcement
learning). To harness IC in the training stage, the following
challenges have to be taken up: (1) Formal challenge: Assess
the limits of how parameters can be inferred at present, crys-
tallized in the validation/verification tradeoff; (2) Substan-
tive challenge:Make a validation commitment that is accept-
able to present stakeholders; (3) Discursive challenge: Form
a team consensus around verification strategies to be pursued
during deployment and define alternate design strategies that
might aid parameter inference.
The systemmust be trained to bridge the gap between fea-
tures by generating correlates: it must take in data, update
priors, and handle edge cases. This is done with the help of
engineers who interface between the problem the system is
meant to solve and the workings of the system itself. Here,
the minimum requirements for certifying safe outcomes are
impartial assessments of the following questions:
Verification:Was the right system built? Are the needs of
prospective users being met? Is the specified problem solved
or not? Is the system able to predict what it was meant to?
Validation:Was the system built right? Are there hidden
utility monsters or emergent biases? Is there risk of strategic
behavior or manipulation? What information channels must
be provided to users to minimize these likelihoods?
Systems whose models are made more accurate or ro-
bust for well-specified environments (and subpopulations
of people) will be made brittle and possibly unwork-
able for poorly-defined environments, which can result in
disparate impacts, especially among yet underrepresented
(and undersampled) minorities that already face systemic
marginalization and are not properly represented on AI de-
sign teams (West, Whittaker, and Crawford 2019). This ef-
fect can clearly be seen in the case between AWS and the
ACLU. Here, the designers of Rekognition created the sys-
tem with common commercial tasks in mind (e.g. senti-
ment analysis), and determined their own confidence levels
through extensive internal verification. However, the ACLU
deployed Rekognition to a task that it was not explicitly
meant to perform, i.e. matching faces of politicians to those
of recent arrestees, and indicated a weakness in the way the
system was validated.
A commitment to team consensus is needed to inte-
grate the problems of value alignment into standard pro-
cedures for quality assurance. This is achieved by forc-
ing agreement among system engineers about how to al-
locate sparse team resources between system verification
and validation in order to manage under-specification risks
and mitigate the perversion of intended users’ semantic and
moral commitments. The team must decide: what com-
mitments to contracted users are necessary for the de-
sired balance of model testing to be adequate? Here “qual-
ity management” must be elevated to the contestation and
adjudication of how (possibly pluralist) values are opera-
tionalized without compromising comparability. In the case
of Rekognition, AWS implemented a confidence threshold
slider with additional documentation commenting on how
it should be set for different contexts that will require dis-
tinct value hierarchies (e.g. law enforcement vs. automatic
image tagging) (Amazon Web Services 2019). However, per
the ACLU comment in response to Amazon’s defense of
the system (ACLU 2018), it is unclear whether this specific
metric is sufficient to validate consensus among all relevant
stakeholders (e.g. members of Congress, government agen-
cies, Amazon employees) rather than necessary for system
verification alone, as some of its confidence thresholds ap-
pear arbitrary.
Deployment
Finally, the system must define use cases in terms of a user
contract that identifies terms of consent and ensures inter-
pretive understanding without coercion. The resulting de-
ployment conditions determine the authority of the system’s
representations in the context of user agency, i.e. what the
user wants the system to be for them. Here we appropri-
ate tradeoffs already identified by social theorists regarding
the moral authority and political powers of social institu-
tions (Flew 2009). To preserve IC in the deployment stage,
the following have to be taken up: (1) Formal challenge:
Assess what kind(s) of agency users have if the verification
fails, crystallized in the exit/voice dilemma; (2) Substantive
challenge:Make a commitment to an open feedback channel
by which users express their values on their terms; (3) Dis-
cursive challenge: Justify that channel by means of a public
commitment to users that establishes that channel as trust-
worthy.
Resolving these challenges requires representative input
and mitigation of issues for the following:
Exit: Are users able to withdraw fully from using the
product or platform? Is there any risk in this? Are there com-
peting products or platforms they can use? Have assurances
been given about user data, optimization, and certification
after the user withdraws?
Voice: Can users articulate proposals in a way that makes
certain concerns a matter of public interest? Are clear pro-
posal channels provided for users, and are they given the
opportunity to contribute regularly? Are the proposals high-
lighted frequently considered and tested, e.g. through system
safety? Are users kept informed and regularly updated?
To the extent that proposed value hierarchies remain in-
determinate after the commitments made during design and
training, deployment challenges systems to handle the mul-
tiple objectives, values, and priorities of diverse users. At
stake here are the unexpressed moral commitments of sub-
populations not originally considered part of the potential
userbase, who must bear the “cost function” of specifica-
tion. Concretely, deployment administrators must determine
whether the user will interpret the system agreement as pri-
marily economic (in which case the user acts as a con-
sumer) or political (in which case the user acts as a citizen).
More Exit implies a market setting, while more Voice sug-
gests a political context. For example, the user agreements
of Rekognition may be understood either in terms of private
contracts (in which case data is treated as a commodity and
alternative platforms are implied to exist) or public assur-
ances (in which case data is inalienable and Rekognition is
interpreted as a public utility or service). If the former takes
precedence, Rekognition’s deployment might be regulated
with private certification that attests the features and uses of
data it forbids; if the latter is more important, deployment
increasingly depends on a public accreditation that guaran-
tees the user’s legal protections will take priority in all use
cases regardless of features or data.
Deployment administrators and their regulating authori-
ties must cultivate public accountability to deal with these
challenges, ensuring both Voice and Exit remain possible
for users such that some form of accountability is main-
tained: anyone can leave if they want, but enough people
choose to remain because they trust in their ability to ex-
press concerns as needed. This balance must hold regardless
of the specific commitment being made–for example, AWS
may specify some channel by which vulnerable groups can
opt out of a publicly-operated Rekognition use context (pre-
serving Exit), or supply private contractors with a default
user agreement that must be relayed to anyone whose data
will be used by the system (preserving Voice). Either way,
administrators should model model people neither as con-
sumers (a customer, client, or operator treated more or less
as a black box) nor as citizens (a subject with guaranteed
rights, among them the right to dissent to relevant forms of
political power) without making the commitment explicit as
justification for the terms of deployment.
Conclusion
Clarifying the sociotechnical foundations of safety require-
ments for AI systems will lay the groundwork for system de-
velopers to take part in distinct dissent channels proactively,
before the risks posed by AI systems become technically
or politically insurmountable. We anticipate this set of so-
ciotechnical commitments will need to be integrated into the
training of engineers, data scientists, and designers as quali-
fications for the operation and management of advanced AI
systems in the wild. Ultimately, the public itself must be ed-
ucated about the assumptions, abilities, and limitations of
these systems so that informed dissent bemade desirable and
attainable as systems are being deployed–deliberation is the
goal of AI Safety, not the procedure by which it is ensured.
We endorse this approach due to the computationally un-
derdetermined, semantically indeterminate, and politically
obfuscated value hierarchies that will continue to define di-
verse social orders both now and in the future. Democratic
dissent, as a pathway to system development, is necessary
for such systems to safeguard the possibility of IC and allow
users to define the contours of their own values. To para-
phrase Reinhold Niebuhr, AI’s capacity for value alignment
makes development commitments possible, but its inclina-
tion to misalignment makes commitments necessary.
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Prominent Approaches to Vagueness
Below we briefly present four prominent approaches to
vagueness as attempted responses to the problem of norma-
tive uncertainty, and tie them to existing vital approaches in
the AI Safety literature.
In Epistemicism, all items of value can (and must) be
ranked against each other in order for vagueness to be re-
solved; even if some things are fundamentally “apples and
oranges”, there must be some degree to which one is prefer-
able over the other, however much regret or compromise
must be faced as a consequence. Within the x-risk litera-
ture, a recent epistemicist approach to resolving normative
uncertainty is metanormativism. As proposed by William
MacAskill (MacAskill 2014), metanormativism seeks to ar-
ticulate ”second-order norms” that guide how one should act
when multiple appealing moral doctrines are available–for
example, whether or how an advanced AI system capable of
transforming individual/group/civilization utility should be
designed. As one example,MacAskill, whose work has been
cited in support of technical work on value alignment and
value learning (Soares 2015), has proposed a “choice wor-
thiness function” that would generate reward functions in
an “appropriate” manner, where appropriateness is defined
as “the degree to which the decision-maker ought to choose
that option, in the sense of ought that is relevant to decision-
making under normative uncertainty” (MacAskill 2016). In
a safety context, such a function would provide guidance
for AI theorists and designers about what decision proce-
dures are acceptable or unacceptable for the system to fol-
low, specifically when the goal state and risk scale are diffi-
cult to define.
Metanormativism still requires the existence of a clear,
positive value relation between available ethical actions:
one must be unambiguously better, worse, or equal to
the other for the choice worthiness function to hold.
In this way, Epistemicism holds out for some “Platonic
value function” that defines an absolute hierarchy of val-
ues which, while currently unknown, can be solicited and
learned by sufficiently-capable automated systems. One
example in the context of AI Safety is recent work by
(Hadfield-Menell and Hadfield 2018) on incomplete con-
tracting, in which suggestions are made to let robots repli-
cate the external normative social order to overcome un-
avoidable misspecification of human objectives in AI reward
functions. Similarly, (Irving and Askell 2019) propose ad-
dressing misspecification by “asking people questions about
what they want, training machine learning (ML) models on
this data, and optimizing AI systems to do well according to
these learned models”, rather than looking beyond the con-
fines of the reward function.
But there is a wider problem of defining what safety
means throughout the development pipeline that transcends
the epistemic uncertainty about which ethical norms should
guide design decisions. The examples in the section on The
Vagueness of Safety show “safety” issues, particularly once
AI systems expand in their application, cannot be resolved
through metanormative guidance at the design stage alone,
and require a wider sociotechnical diagnosis of the entire
development pipeline. Still, what the normative foundations
of AI Safety should be remains unclear. On one hand, most
technical AI Safety aims to capture humans values through
a single, partially-specified reward function, either a pri-
ori or through ongoing human-agent interactions. Yet even
carefully-designed formalisms that are sensitive to the im-
plicit concerns and priorities of human agents are not guar-
anteed to learn the right preference structures in the right
way without new forms of surveillance, control, and as-
signed roles for both humans and the systems themselves,
see for instance (Hadfield-Menell et al. 2016). Consider also
the proposal by (Eckersley 2018) that, given the impossibil-
ity of simultaneously maximizing total wellbeing and aver-
age wellbeing while also avoiding suffering, “the human is
torn between objectives that fundamentally cannot be traded
off against each other”. Such system setups are limited in
three key ways: (1) they can never formalize everything, and
require subsequent developers to organize around them; (2)
they attempt to resolve both content and procedure from the
get-go, rather than treat the sociotechnical development of
AI systems as a dynamic and iterative problem; (3) they are
limited in addressing the wider spectrum of values across
distinct peoples and cultures.
Semantic indeterminacy, however, asserts a fundamental
ambiguity or arbitrariness in how values are related to each
other. This position is practically adopted by software en-
gineers and tech enthusiasts for whom value indetermina-
cies comprise an investment opportunity for new AI sys-
tems. The following quote fromMark Zuckerberg is illustra-
tive: “I’m also curious about whether there is a fundamen-
tal mathematical law underlying human social relationships
that governs the balance of who and what we all care about
[...] I bet there is” (quoted after (Hildebrandt 2019)).
The danger here is that software engineers may arbitrar-
ily neglect certain value hierarchies, either by failing to in-
terrogate the context of historical data or external cost bi-
ases through design choices that moralize existing struc-
tural inequalities (Eubanks 2018). As such, this position
neglects the public interest as potentially compromised by
the external costs of society-wide technological innova-
tions, a problem at the heart of democratic political the-
ory (Dewey 1954).
Value pluralism holds that there cannot or will never be
an ultimate scheme for organizing values against each other,
because our reasons for holding them are incomparable. No-
tably, (MacAskill 2013) defines “infectious” incomparabil-
ity as equivalent to nihilism, given its “view that the notions
of good and bad and of right and wrong are illusions and
that, objectively speaking, no option or state of affairs is
better than any other, nor are any two options or states of
affairs equally good”. However, value pluralism is widely
adopted by critical theorists who highlight how formal value
specifications, no matter how well-intentioned, always end
up excluding certain subpopulations in favor of others. Fur-
thermore, in any system design, fundamental choices have
to be made about how values of relevant stakeholders, in-
cluding those indirectly affected by the system, result in
some value hierarchy that has real consequences for how
the benefits and harms of a system play out across society.
(Crawford 2016) endorses the concept of agonistic plural-
ism as offered by (Mouffe 1999) as a design ideal for en-
gineers: “[T]heories of agonism allow us to widen the per-
spective to include the contested spaces where algorithms
are designed. They are always made by and in relation to
people: they are in flux and embedded in hybrid spaces.
[...] These workplaces are themselves spaces of everyday
conflict and dissent, where algorithmic design decisions are
made after debate, disagreement, tests and failures.” Mean-
while, (Hoffmann 2019) argues that fairness approaches fail
to address the hierarchical logic that produces advantaged
and disadvantaged subjects: “by centering disadvantage, we
fail to question the normative conditions that produce - and
promote the qualities or interests of - advantaged subjects,”
and disproportionately put safety harms on already vulnera-
ble populations. (Hildebrandt 2019) takes these perspectives
to their logical extreme and advocates for agonistic machine
learning, suggesting that the human self should be treated as
fundamentally incomputible.
Moreover, value pluralism is not opposed to external
mechanisms that regulate how our diverse commitments
may be reconciled (James 1979).
Intuitive Comparability (Chang 2017) instead endorses a
fourth position called intuitive comparability (IC): while
many human values seem incommensurable (e.g. equality
vs. liberty, good nutrition vs. gourmandism), humans are
nevertheless able to articulate evaluative differences to make
comparisons, even if two values or concepts are not directly
measurable against each other. IC is particularly relevant for
what she calls hard choices: when different alternatives are
on a par, “it may matter very much which you choose, but
one alternative isnt better than the other [...] alternatives are
in the same neighborhood of value, in the same league of
value, while at the same time being very different in kind of
value (Chang 2017). Resolving hard choices requires nor-
mative reasoning: “when your given reasons are on a par,
you have the normative power to create new will-based rea-
sons for one option over another by putting your agency be-
hind some feature of one of the options. By putting your
will behind a feature of an optionby standing for ityou can
be that in virtue of which something is a will-based reason
for choosing that option.” (Chang 2017)
We propose IC as an intermediary position that serves as
a stepping stone to a complete sociotechnical depiction of
normative uncertainty, one that will need to combine the in-
tuitions of technical AI Safety and critical perspectives It
can accommodate the pluralist perspectives and value com-
mitments of marginal stakeholders bymeans of development
standards that help reconcile political power with technical
innovation, all while avoiding defeatism. It entails neither a
single nor infinite number of reward functions, but rather a
capacity for mediating different definitions of safety in the
context of systems that may know our values differently than
we know ourselves. Consequently, abstract criteria for ap-
propriateness may not be applicable to AI Safety until the
philosophical problem of vagueness is addressed throughout
the development pipeline by incorporating the hard-learned
lessons of values and ethics in human-computer interaction
design (see (Shilton 2018) for an extensive overview) and
STS, which the AI Safety communities have yet to absorb.
These conclusions also find support in the field of Com-
puter Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW). Presented as
the field’s central intellectual challenge, (Ackerman 2000)
described the inevitability of the social-technical gap of
computer systems; the inherent divide between what we
know we must support socially and what we can support
technically.
